The Paradox of Diplomacy: Between Security Pragmatism and the “Free and Active” Principle
SEJARAHID.com The world is drifting into a new and uncomfortable phase. While the old architecture of international order still stands, its foundations are quietly shifting. Treaties remain in force and charters still exist, but more and more of the decisions that actually move the needle are no longer being made inside the institutions designed to represent the whole of humanity. They are being made elsewhere, in exclusive rooms with shorter guest lists.
Amid the wreckage of stalled UN reforms and a global rivalry that is only getting louder, Washington has pushed a new forum into the light: the Board of Peace (BOP). Chaired by President Trump and launched just weeks ago in Davos, it is presented as a flexible, “no-nonsense” alternative to the UN—designed to bypass the usual deadlock and finally “get things done.” It sounds attractive, because who wouldn’t want faster peace? But speed is never neutral, and neither is the structure of the room where that speed is generated.
Two Tracks of Global Peace: The United Nations vs. the Board of Peace
To fully assess the implications of BOP, it is essential to examine its fundamental differences from the United Nations. The UN operates under an international charter, with universal membership, formal accountability mechanisms, and globally recognized legal legitimacy. Despite its frequent inefficiencies and political compromises, the UN provides a normative space in which small and developing states retain formal legal standing.
By contrast, BOP functions as a limited forum without a binding international charter, without universal accountability mechanisms, and with decision-making structures heavily influenced by its founders and principal donors. This distinction underscores that BOP is not merely a “fast track” to peace, but an inherently exclusive pathway with minimal collective oversight.
BOP and the Risk of Normalizing Parallel Multilateralism
The simultaneous operation of two peace-building tracks creates the risk of normalizing parallel multilateralism. The global system may gradually fragment between universal, rules-based institutions and ad hoc forums driven by financial power and strategic alliances.
If this trend persists, global peace will no longer be the outcome of collective agreement, but the product of limited negotiations among powerful actors. Developing countries risk being relegated to policy followers rather than norm-shapers within the international system.
The Initial Composition of the Board of Peace: States Reportedly Involved
To date, the Board of Peace has not announced a formal, legally binding membership roster. However, based on policy statements, high-level meetings, and observable diplomatic engagement patterns, several countries have been reported to be involved or participating in the early phase of BOP, including:
- United States – principal initiator and central source of funding
- Saudi Arabia – key U.S. security partner in the Middle East
- United Arab Emirates – regional partner in security stabilization frameworks
- Qatar – regional financial and diplomatic actor
- Bahrain – close U.S. defense partner
- Israel – strategic partner in security and intelligence
- Australia – Indo-Pacific partner with intensive defense cooperation
- Japan – non-NATO strategic partner with regional stability interests
- South Korea – primary U.S. security ally in East Asia
- Indonesia – reportedly involved in early coordination and dialogue
This composition generates a politically difficult-to-ignore perception: the Board of Peace operates largely within the framework of U.S. strategic interests. With the United States acting simultaneously as initiator, primary funder, and dominant agenda-setter, BOP appears to function less as a neutral global peace forum and more as an instrument for consolidating Washington’s geopolitical interests. In this configuration, the pursuit of peace risks being reduced to an extension of a single state’s foreign policy rather than a product of collective international consensus—rendering BOP particularly problematic for developing countries that rely on rules-based multilateralism for the protection of their interests.
Conversely, several major proponents of traditional multilateralism—including states with central roles within UN structures—have shown no clear institutional engagement with BOP. Their absence reinforces the conclusion that BOP is not a universal forum, but a selective coalition grounded in geopolitical alignment, security interests, and resource contribution.
Legal Sovereignty: The Erosion of Indonesia’s Strategic Leverage
Indonesia’s sovereignty protection is inextricably linked to the integrity of international law. The legal regime of UNCLOS 1982 is not merely a treaty, but the very foundation of Indonesia’s legitimacy in strategically sensitive zones like the North Natuna Sea. By engaging with parallel mechanisms such as the Board of Peace (BOP), Indonesia is not just making a “pragmatic choice,” but is venturing into a high-stakes normative gamble.
The deconstruction of this logic is clear: If Indonesia legitimizes an ad hoc organization that lacks universal accountability, it effectively sabotages its own moral and legal standing. It becomes intellectually and diplomatically inconsistent to demand that other nations adhere to UN-based international law in Natuna while Indonesia simultaneously supports extra-institutional frameworks that erode the legitimacy of the United Nations. This involvement represents a direct threat to Indonesia’s long-term sovereign instruments, as it inadvertently weakens the very rules-based multilateralism that serves as Indonesia’s primary shield against external encroachment.
Transactional Diplomacy Trap
There is a massive temptation to be transactional. For a seat at the table, countries are reportedly asked for a USD 1.1 billion (IDR 17 trillion) “contribution”—a staggering sum for a nation where over a hundred million people still live on the edge of poverty.
President Prabowo has suggested that our presence is necessary to advocate for Palestinian statehood from within. But history suggests that large power structures rarely bend around lone participants; more often, the participant bends to the structure. If we aren’t careful, we won’t be shaping the board from within; we will be letting the board redefine what “independence” even means for Indonesia.
